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ABSTRACT—The increase in wrongful conviction litigation has engendered 
a number of new doctrinal problems. This Note examines the existing rules 
governing insurance coverage for wrongful-conviction-related torts, in 
particular, due process claims for Brady violations. It then explores the 
rationale for the continuous trigger doctrine in the asbestos context, and 
argues that wrongful conviction claims call for a similar approach due to 
comparable latency concerns. There is a particular focus on Illinois law due 
to the state’s prevalence of wrongful conviction litigation and recent shifts 
in the law governing insurance triggers for malicious prosecution. 
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It is an axiom of the law that for every wrong there is a remedy. 
—Fuller v. Aylesworth, 75 F. 694, 696 (6th Cir. 1896) 
INTRODUCTION 
The advent of DNA testing and increased awareness among both the 
public and law enforcement has led to an unprecedented rise in the 
exoneration of individuals who were wrongfully convicted of crimes they 
did not commit. Official misconduct is a contributing factor in nearly half of 
wrongful convictions.1 The most common manifestation of official 
misconduct is the suppression of exculpatory evidence—a Brady violation.2 
 
1 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, THE FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS 11 (2015), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/1600_Exonerations.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/ZDG8-YHSY] [hereinafter THE FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS] (official misconduct was 
a contributing factor in 45% of all cases and 60% of homicide convictions). 
2 SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 1989–2012, at 66 (2012), http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/
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While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does provide an exonerated plaintiff with a legal 
theory of recovery to obtain damages for Brady violations,3 difficult 
questions of liability still arise when the insured municipality inevitably 
seeks coverage for the claim under its Law Enforcement Liability (LEL) 
policies. Because the wrongfully convicted are often in prison for years, if 
not decades,4 this precipitates disputes between numerous insurers and 
municipalities about multiple policies. As civil litigation stemming from 
wrongful convictions has risen,5 courts have attempted to referee these 
disputes by applying the trigger approach for the tort of malicious 
prosecution to more or less every wrongful-conviction-related tort.6 As a 
result, only a single year’s insurance policy, that which was in place during 
the triggering event, is implicated by any given wrongful conviction. 
This approach is problematic for three reasons, which are especially 
acute as they relate to Brady violations. First, the existing approaches to 
insurance triggers for malicious prosecution are outdated and do not reflect 
the recent substantial increase in exonerations. Second, applying a uniform 
trigger across all torts ignores the substantive doctrinal differences between 
them, the agency relationships and actions behind them, and the disturbing 
 
Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/UK48-KAJN] (“The most 
common serious form of official misconduct is concealing exculpatory evidence from the defendant and 
the court.”). 
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Sunil Bhave, The Innocent Have Rights Too: Expanding Brady v. 
Maryland To Provide the Criminally Innocent with a Cause of Action Against Police Officers Who 
Withhold Exculpatory Evidence, 45 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 2 (2011) (“Through the possibility of 
compensatory and punitive damages, § 1983 suits against police officers could serve as an effective 
deterrent against the withholding of exculpatory evidence to obtain convictions.”). 
4 Basic Patterns, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/Basic-Patterns.aspx [http://perma.cc/3SMP-GBR7] (noting that the average length of 
imprisonment is nine years, with 39% of exonerees imprisoned for ten years or more, and 59% imprisoned 
for at least five years).  
5 See, e.g., John Conroy & Rob Warden, A Tale of Lives Lost, Tax Dollars Wasted and Justice 
Denied, BETTER GOV’T ASS’N, (June 18, 2011), http://www.bettergov.org/investigations/
wrongful_convictions_1.aspx [http://perma.cc/TY54-XKTR] (describing a study suggesting that in 
Illinois, “the total financial cost to state taxpayers will approach or surpass $300 million in the next several 
years as 16 civil suits now pending and a 17th to be filed later this year are settled or come to trial”); see 
also Recent Findings, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/
exoneration/Pages/Recent-Findings.aspx [http://perma.cc/F2T3-HDFL] (noting that 2014 was a record 
year for exonerations and that there was an increase in conviction integrity units within prosecutors’ 
offices).  
6 See, e.g., Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124, 1130–32 (7th Cir. 2012) 
(mentioning due process claim before exclusively discussing trigger for malicious prosecution); Am. 
Safety Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 678 F.3d 475, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting underlying claim 
for suppression of exculpatory evidence without elaboration and applying equivalent trigger for malicious 
prosecution and “constitutional wrongs”); Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McFatridge, 604 F.3d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 
2010) (noting claim of suppressed exculpatory evidence but foregoing separate discussion of due process 
claim accrual); see also Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2014) (vacating 
lower court’s summary judgment decision and finding that the lower court failed to distinguish between 
Brady claims and malicious prosecution). 
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temporal quality of the harm suffered by people wrongfully incarcerated. 
Third, to the extent the current approach has the virtue of simplifying the 
assignment of liability, it does so poorly and unfairly to the detriment of all 
involved—the insurance companies, the municipalities, and the exonerees. 
The financial implications of these issues are increasingly troubling. 
While phrases like “municipal insurance coverage” may evoke sad and 
stilted images of the disappointed Willy Loman, the law’s inadequate 
response to the rapid increase in exonerations threatens to leave 
municipalities without coverage for the sometimes extraordinary liability at 
issue in these claims. But this is not merely a question of fairness between 
cities and their insurers or of unexpected impositions on taxpayers. In an era 
where local and state governments increasingly exist in the shadow of 
financial distress,7 judgments against less prosperous municipalities may 
carry the threat of bankruptcy and become virtually uncollectible. If every 
wrong is to have a remedy, courts must modify their approach to insurance 
triggers for Brady claims and wrongful-conviction-related torts more 
generally. To stay the course runs the risk of making exonerees victims of 
the justice system twice over. 
The courts should instead adopt a continuous trigger like that used in 
asbestos exposure cases.8 Both wrongful convictions and asbestos cases 
involve latency difficulties, though of different natures. Nonetheless, these 
differences actually support the case for treating wrongful convictions like 
asbestos exposure. By applying a continuous trigger, courts will 
simultaneously be in a position to assign liability where it belongs and also 
maintain the option of distributing liability equitably across multiple 
policies, if necessary. In other words, it would free courts to be both more 
and less precise in apportioning liability, and this flexibility would in turn 
further the parties’ contractual intentions to indemnify the wrongful acts of 
law enforcement. Replacing the current formalism with a more realistic and 
flexible approach is necessary to facilitate actual coverage for all the 
wrongful acts of law enforcement. Otherwise, incoherency in legal doctrines 
like Brady will unnecessarily place some conduct beyond the reach of 
 
7 See, e.g., Michael Lewis, California and Bust, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 2011), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2011/11/michael-lewis-201111 [http://perma.cc/2Y7T-QG4X] (“From 
2002 to 2008, the states had piled up debts right alongside their citizens’: their level of indebtedness, as 
a group, had almost doubled, and state spending had grown by two-thirds.”); STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK 
FORCE, REPORT OF THE STATE BUDGET CRISIS TASK FORCE: FINAL REPORT (Jan. 14, 2014), 
http://www.statebudgetcrisis.org/wpcms/wp-content/images/SBCTF_FINALREPORT.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/Y2AC-WQCB] (finding that “[s]tate and local revenues only partially recovered since 
the recession that began in 2008” and that “[r]eductions in federal spending have made state and local 
finances more chaotic and more difficult to manage”). 
8 See 15 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 220:27 nn.6–7 (3d ed. 2014). 
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insurance policies that were surely meant to cover them. The current 
triggering approach reaches the absurd result of essentially finding that some 
wrongful acts by law enforcement will not be covered by any LEL policy, 
even if a municipality diligently purchased one every year. Most 
importantly, however, flexibility would ensure an adequate remedy for the 
exoneree. 
There are strong doctrinal and policy reasons for the application of a 
continuous trigger. An isolated trigger is ill suited to the complicated 
chronology of Brady violations and its status as a process tort committed by 
individual actors. Illinois insurance law has explicitly rejected treating 
protracted events as discrete, to the benefit of insurance companies.9 A 
continuous trigger apportioning culpability for a consolidated constitutional 
harm like imprisonment is imprecise, if not intractable. Concerns about 
wrongful convictions mirroring the protracted litigation associated with 
asbestos exposure are mitigated by both the limited number of exonerees in 
absolute terms and the more easily divisible nature of days in prison (as 
opposed to disease and exposure). Accordingly, Part I will examine the 
relatively recent and dramatic increase in exonerations and civil litigation for 
wrongful convictions, particularly in Illinois. This will provide context and 
highlight how modern developments are significant enough to render the 
prior doctrine out of date. Part II will provide a brief overview of the 
development of the Brady doctrine and examine particular behavior that rises 
to the level of a Brady violation. Part III will explore another wrongful-
conviction-related tort: malicious prosecution. It will also explain a number 
of the relevant insurance principles governing the triggering of policies in 
wrongful conviction suits, and briefly discuss the continuous trigger applied 
in asbestos cases and its rationale. Part IV will argue that the single isolated 
policy trigger used for malicious prosecution claims is incompatible with the 
Brady doctrine. Finally, Part V will assert that a continuous trigger doctrine, 
such as that used for asbestos exposure, is better suited to address Brady 
claims because it is easily administered and better tracks the substantive 
conduct underlying Brady violations. 
Ultimately, a continuous insurance trigger is the best hope for 
coherence and common sense, and the best insurance against communities 
otherwise powerless to redress their wrongs. A continuous trigger for Brady 
violations is also an opportunity for courts to craft a rule on the back end that 
mitigates the Brady doctrine’s failures and disappointments during the trial 
at the front end. Nothing can adequately compensate for a wrongful 
conviction, but ensuring something is better than nothing and a necessary 
 
9 See Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay, 905 N.E.2d 747, 756 (Ill. 2009). 
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acknowledgment that our society will hold itself accountable for the 
imprisonment of the innocent. 
I. WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS AND EXONERATIONS: PREVALENCE, 
CAUSES, AND COSTS 
In order to contextualize the practical significance of this doctrinal 
dilemma, this Part will outline the prevalence, causes, and costs of wrongful 
convictions. Between January 1989 and May 18, 2015, there were 1600 
individual exonerations.10 Texas, New York, California, and Illinois account 
for 698 of the exonerations between them, with 151 in Illinois alone.11 The 
advent of DNA testing and the work of clinics have made possible the 
exoneration of people who were wrongfully convicted and substantially 
increased both public and law enforcement awareness about the problem of 
wrongful convictions.12 While DNA exonerations may have raised 
awareness of the problem of conviction integrity, a far larger number of 
exonerations are accomplished without DNA testing.13 Of the 1600 people 
exonerated between January 1989 and May 18, 2015, only 398 of them were 
exonerated through the use of DNA evidence.14 
Looking forward, the incidence of exonerations is on the rise, with a 
record 91 in each of 2012 and 2013, and 125 in 2014.15 Official misconduct 
was a contributing factor in nearly half of all exonerations as of May 18, 
2015.16 The most common type of misconduct is the suppression of 
exculpatory evidence, so-called Brady violations.17 The problem has 
persisted and, in fact, increased to such a degree that Chief Judge Kozinski 
recently declared, “There is an epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the 
land. Only judges can put a stop to it.”18 
As exonerations of wrongfully convicted individuals continue to 
accumulate, city and state governments will also increasingly be forced to 
 
10 THE FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 1, at 2. 
11 Id. at 12. 
12 See Steve Schmadeke & Dan Hinkel, Prosecutors from Across U.S. Discuss Correcting Their Own 
Mistakes, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 29, 2014, 9:16 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-conviction-
integrity-northwestern-alvarez-met-20141029-story.html [http://perma.cc/SE22-9E53] (discussing 
prosecutor participation in conviction integrity conference and implementation of conviction integrity 
units).  
13 THE FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 1, at 5. 
14 Id. 
15 NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2014, http://www.law.umich.edu/
special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2014_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/68JN-PE4E].  
16 THE FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 1, at 11 (official misconduct was a contributing factor 
in 45% of all cases and 60% of homicide convictions). 
17 See GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 66. 
18 United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
110-1 DELICH MASTER COPY II (DO NOT DELETE) 12/14/2015 11:05 AM 
110:223 (2015) Ensuring Insurance 
229 
defend themselves against sizeable civil claims by the exonerees.19 The 
liability for wrongful convictions can be considerable and complicated 
because of the generally long gap in time between the initiation of a 
prosecution and the ultimate exoneration.20 These complexities are 
compounded by the existence of years of insurance policies and legal 
principles ill suited to sorting out liability appropriately, and there is reason 
to think that, as more claims are filed, courts will be forced to adopt new 
approaches.21 This is especially true in light of the fact that misconduct and 
the suppression of exculpatory evidence play such a prominent role in 
wrongful convictions. Not only is the suppression of exculpatory evidence a 
significant contributing factor, it is one that is particularly difficult to detect 
and can span decades.22 
II. THE BRADY DOCTRINE 
The Brady doctrine protects a defendant’s right to exculpatory or 
impeachment evidence available at the time of trial.23 In 1963, Brady v. 
Maryland held that constitutional due process requirements imposed an 
affirmative duty on prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence to 
defendants.24 While the Brady decision was initially perceived to be a 
powerful protection for defendants’ due process rights, it has failed to deliver 
 
19 See Conroy & Warden, supra note 5. 
20 Id. (“Through the Illinois Court of Claims, the state provides compensation to the wrongfully 
convicted based on their years of imprisonment, and those costs totaled $8.2 million. A total of $31.6 
million has been paid to private attorneys to defend governments and their employees in civil suits filed 
after exoneration, and $155.9 million has been paid to exonerees in settlements and judgments. Total 
litigation and compensation expenditures were $195.7 million. . . . The BGA/CWC study found a 
substantial lag time between wrongful conviction and exoneration (the average length of imprisonment 
in the 85 cases was more than 10 years). Thus in Illinois, the financial costs and the attendant human toll 
is likely to proceed apace for the foreseeable future.”). 
21 See Jonathan L. Schwartz & Kelly M. Ognibene, The Contours of Malicious Prosecution and False 
Imprisonment Coverage: The Shawshank Redemption Reimagined, FOR THE DEFENSE, May 2011, at 58, 
62 (“In other words, while a host of insureds and insurers seeking contribution from other insurers later 
in the tail of coverage have been unable, in general, to secure coverage under policies purchased later in 
the tail, as individuals file more wrongful conviction lawsuits, we can expect to see more nuanced and 
complex insurance claims that may require courts following the majority rule to interpret the trigger of 
coverage more flexibly than they currently do.”). 
22 See GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 2, at 67 (“Misbehavior is rarely advertised. If misconduct is 
not uncovered in litigation or by journalists, we don’t know about it. As a result, our data underestimate 
the frequency of official misconduct, as we’ve mentioned.”). 
23 Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of Innocence, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 423 (2010). 
24 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt 
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).  
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on its promises.25 This is the result of both the practical difficulties in the 
application of the doctrine and court decisions refining it in a way that 
significantly relaxed the burden placed on prosecutors.26 In regard to the 
former, two competing policies drive the difficulty of Brady doctrine 
application—“upholding the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system 
while simultaneously placing a premium on fairness and justice.”27 
A Brady violation consists of (1) the prosecution’s suppression of 
evidence that is (2) “favorable to the defense” and (3) “material to an issue 
at trial.”28 Generally speaking, evidence favorable to the defense can be 
either exculpatory evidence or impeachment evidence.29 Brady violations 
can often be characterized as either omissions or positive action 
interchangeably—for instance, destroying evidence versus failing to disclose 
the destruction of evidence.30 The interplay between action and omission in 
the Brady doctrine generates difficulties and is discussed below in Part IV. 
The question of “when” Brady violations occur is of utmost importance 
for analyzing insurance triggers and one of the primary sources of the current 
confusion in this and other contexts.31 The Supreme Court recently limited 
Brady’s application to trial,32 but the doctrine still implicates actions taken 
both before and after trial. In 2009, the Supreme Court held in District 
Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial District v. Osborne that there is no 
Brady obligation on prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence uncovered 
 
25 Leslie Kuhn Thayer, The Exclusive Control Requirement: Striking Another Blow to the Brady 
Doctrine, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (“But, while originally touted as a ‘superhero’ decision, the 
power and scope of the Brady doctrine’s protection have fallen well short of its expectations.”); see also 
Jones, supra note 23, at 415 (“The government’s duty to disclose favorable evidence to the defense under 
Brady v. Maryland has become one of the most unenforced constitutional mandates in criminal law.”).  
26 Thayer, supra note 25, at 1029. 
27 Id. (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985)). A series of judicial refinements 
have also restricted the doctrine’s effectiveness. See id. One example is the Supreme Court’s 
establishment of a materiality standard requiring a “reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
Some state courts also impose an additional “exclusive control” requirement on evidence, finding no 
Brady obligation exists when the evidence is not in the exclusive control of the prosecution and a 
reasonably diligent defense lawyer could have discovered it himself. Thayer, supra note 25, at 1031.  
28 Boss v. Pierce, 263 F.3d 734, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2001).  
29 Jones, supra note 23, at 423; see also, e.g., Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(providing an illustrative example of the wide range of conduct and evidence that constitutes Brady 
material, such as inducing a witness to give a false identification, creating false evidence, or destroying 
exculpatory evidence).  
30 See, e.g., Manning, 355 F.3d at 1033 (noting the plaintiff’s allegation that government agents 
“failed to tell prosecutors” about their alleged misconduct). 
31 See, e.g., infra Part IV, for a discussion of the current circuit split over Brady claim accrual in the 
context of retrials.  
32 Dist. Att’y’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009). 
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post-conviction.33 This decision clearly restricted Brady material to the 
evidence available at the time of trial.34 But despite the Osborne decision’s 
emphasis on Brady as a trial right, the Seventh Circuit has continued to find 
obligations to disclose Brady material in the post-conviction context.35 The 
Seventh Circuit interpreted Osborne to mean only that there is no Brady 
obligation to disclose new exculpatory evidence that comes into existence 
after trial.36 In other words, in the Seventh Circuit, there remains a duty to 
disclose any and all Brady evidence that existed at the time of trial in at least 
some post-conviction proceedings.37 
The temporal confusion of the Brady doctrine also has pretrial 
implications. The duty to disclose known Brady material falls on 
prosecutors, but ignorance of Brady material known to the police does not 
shield a prosecutor from committing a Brady violation. In Kyles v. Whitley, 
the Supreme Court found there is an affirmative duty on prosecutors “to learn 
of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government’s 
behalf in the case, including the police.”38 Not only can prosecutors be 
attributed constructive knowledge of evidence known to law enforcement, 
but under some circumstances police officers themselves may be liable for 
 
33 Id. at 68–69 (“The Court of Appeals went too far, however, in concluding that the Due Process 
Clause requires that certain familiar preconviction trial rights be extended to protect Osborne’s 
postconviction liberty interest.”). 
34 Id. at 69 (“[The respondent’s] right to due process is not parallel to a trial right, but rather must be 
analyzed in light of the fact that he has already been found guilty at a fair trial, and has only a limited 
interest in postconviction relief. Brady is the wrong framework.”). 
35 Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 588 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied sub nom. McFatridge 
v. Whitlock, 133 S. Ct. 981 (2013). 
36 Id. (“The . . . defendants also contend that Whitlock and Steidl have no right to exculpatory 
evidence at post-conviction or clemency proceedings, but they misunderstand the Brady right. It is a trial 
right; the reason there is a continuing obligation on the state to disclose evidence is not because of some 
special right associated with post-conviction or clemency but because ‘the taint on the trial that took place 
continues throughout the proceedings, and thus the duty to disclose and allow correction of that taint 
continues.’ As we explained at length before, Brady and its progeny impose an obligation on state actors 
to disclose exculpatory evidence that is discovered before or during trial. This obligation does not cease 
to exist at the moment of conviction. Otherwise no one could argue a Brady point either on direct appeal 
or in a collateral attack . . . .” (citations omitted) (quoting Steidl v. Fermon, 494 F.3d 623, 630 (7th Cir. 
2007))); Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 514–15 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A prosecutor’s Brady and Giglio 
duties may survive the conclusion of a trial. . . . Therefore, a defendant’s conviction is not final as a matter 
of law until he exhausts the direct appeals afforded to him, and, until that exhaustion, he is entitled to the 
full breadth of due process available. . . . Accordingly, a prosecutor’s Brady and Giglio obligations 
remain in full effect on direct appeal and in the event of retrial because the defendant’s conviction has 
not yet become final, and his right to due process continues to demand judicial fairness. . . . His disclosure 
responsibilities do not end until the defendant either has been acquitted or has availed himself of all the 
direct process to which he is entitled.”). 
37 Fields expressly articulated the duty in connection only to direct appeals and retrials, while 
Whitlock simply noted that a conviction does not extinguish the duty. Fields, 672 F.3d at 514–15; 
Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 588. This arguably leaves open the question of whether the Seventh Circuit would 
find a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence in collateral attacks on convictions. 
38 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
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Brady violations. The Seventh Circuit has found police officers liable for 
Brady violations when they deliberately concealed evidence or provided 
misleading information to non-negligent prosecutors.39 The implications of 
Brady’s complex timelines are analyzed below in Part IV. 
III. MALICIOUS PROSECUTION AND INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR 
WRONGFUL CONVICTION TORTS 
This Part will outline the current insurance coverage regime for 
wrongful conviction torts—the blanket application of the trigger for 
malicious prosecution torts to Brady claims and the associated doctrinal 
uncertainty that has emerged in recent years—and then propose a possible 
solution. While the problem of wrongful convictions is national in scope, 
Illinois is a particularly instructive state for analyzing future difficulties with 
wrongful conviction insurance litigation. In particular, a 2011 study 
projected the future costs to Illinois state taxpayers of wrongful conviction 
litigation to approach $300 million within several years, which makes the 
stakes especially high for both Illinois municipalities and Illinois exonerees 
as a group.40 Moreover, Illinois is consistently in the top four states by sheer 
number of exonerations,41 and it is also one of the few states applying the 
“minority rule,” discussed below in Section B, for triggering insurance 
coverage for malicious prosecutions.42 As a result, a specific focus on Illinois 
law is useful not only because of the relatively large amount of civil litigation 
stemming from wrongful convictions, but also because the laws governing 
insurance coverage have been recently and vigorously litigated and continue 
to be contested due to Illinois’s outlier status nationally.43 Accordingly, this 
 
39 See, e.g., Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 752 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Prosecutors kept in the dark 
by the police (and not negligent in failing to hire other persons to investigate the police) won’t improve 
their performance with or without legal liability for their conduct. Requiring culpable officers to pay 
damages to the victims of their actions, however, holds out promise of both deterring and remediating 
violations of the Constitution.”); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 994 (7th Cir. 1988) (“[A] 
prosecutor’s decision to charge, a grand jury’s decision to indict, a prosecutor’s decision not to drop 
charges but to proceed to trial—none of these decisions will shield a police officer who deliberately 
supplied misleading information that influenced the decision. . . . They cannot hide behind the officials 
whom they have defrauded.”). 
40 See Conroy & Warden, supra note 5. 
41 THE FIRST 1,600 EXONERATIONS, supra note 1, at 12. 
42 Am. Safety Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 678 F.3d 475, 479 (7th Cir. 2012) (“McFatridge 
thus represents a minority view, which the insurers (and the Association) urge us to abandon. A minority 
it may be, but McFatridge does follow the lead of the only Illinois appellate decision on the issue.”). 
43 See Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124 (7th Cir. 2012); Am. Safety, 678 F.3d 
475; Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McFatridge, 604 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2010); Westport Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 
75 F. Supp. 3d 821 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 33 N.E.3d 613 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 2015), petition for leave to appeal denied, 32 N.E.3d 674 (Ill. 2015); St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Ins. Co. v. City of Zion, 18 N.E.3d 193 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014), petition for leave to appeal denied, 23 N.E.3d 
1207 (Ill. 2015). 
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Part will discuss the dominant approach to triggering, the Illinois minority 
approach to triggering, and a possible third path—a continuous trigger—
found primarily in asbestos litigation. 
A. The Dominant Approach to Wrongful Convictions 
As general background, victims of wrongful convictions may file civil 
lawsuits for a number of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, but 
courts typically only analyze two for potential insurance triggers: false arrest 
and malicious prosecution.44 In Wallace v. Kato, the Supreme Court held that 
false arrest and false imprisonment claims accrue when a defendant is held 
pursuant to legal process, while malicious prosecution claims accrue upon 
the favorable termination of legal proceedings.45 Courts have treated these as 
stages of a wrongful conviction that mark two potential insurance triggers,46 
but without much consideration have generally placed all other wrongful 
conviction torts under the umbrella of one of these time stages. Triggers for 
Brady violations are either addressed in a cursory fashion or not at all, and 
courts generally apply the same trigger used for malicious prosecution (with 
some important exceptions).47 
Malicious prosecution is a substantive tort, not a procedural one, and is 
focused in part on the existence of malice and the absence of probable cause 
for the institution of judicial proceedings.48 While the favorable termination 
of the legal proceedings is a requisite element, the “gist” of the tort is the 
filing of charges.49 
It is uncontroversial that a malicious prosecution claim accrues at 
exoneration, but nationally the law is divided on whether insurance coverage 
 
44 See Am. Safety, 678 F.3d at 481 (“One episode of malicious prosecution (or constitutional 
violations leading to wrongful conviction) has just one trigger: exoneration. There can be a second claim. 
As the Supreme Court held in Wallace, wrongful arrest is a distinct theory of liability that can be pursued 
immediately after the arrest.”). 
45 549 U.S. 384, 389–92 (2007). 
46 See, e.g., Am. Safety, 678 F.3d at 481.  
47 See, e.g., Northfield Ins. Co., 701 F.3d at 1130–32 (mentioning due process claim before 
exclusively discussing trigger for malicious prosecution); Am. Safety, 678 F.3d at 477–78 (noting 
underlying claim for suppression of exculpatory evidence without elaboration and applying equivalent 
trigger for malicious prosecution and “constitutional wrongs”); Nat’l Cas. Co., 604 F.3d at 337 (noting 
claim of suppressed exculpatory evidence but foregoing separate discussion of due process claim 
accrual); see also Poventud v. City of New York, 750 F.3d 121, 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2014) (vacating lower 
court’s summary judgment decision and finding that the lower court failed to distinguish between Brady 
claims and malicious prosecution).  
48 See Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2001); Ritchey v. Maksin, 376 N.E.2d 
991, 993 (Ill. 1978). 
49 City of Erie v. Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co., 109 F.3d 156, 160 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Courts adopting the 
majority rule have cited two major principles to explain why the tort of malicious prosecution occurs at 
the time the criminal charges are filed. One common theme is that the ‘essence’, ‘gist’, or ‘focus’ of 
malicious prosecution is the filing of the underlying charges.”). 
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should trigger at the initiation of prosecution or when the claim actually 
accrues at exoneration.50 Most states trigger insurance coverage at the 
initiation of the criminal proceedings, with only a few, including Illinois, 
applying the “minority rule” that triggers coverage at the favorable 
termination or exoneration, when the claim accrued.51 
The majority rule triggering at the initiation of proceedings is justified 
by primarily two considerations: (1) the “essence” or “gist” of the malicious 
prosecution tort is the filing of charges, and (2) it protects the “unwary 
insurance companies” from people or municipalities purchasing coverage in 
anticipation of a termination of proceedings that is favorable to the criminal 
defendant, such as issuing a nolle prosequi,52 that would cause accrual of a 
claim.53 
B. Illinois, the Minority Rule, and Doctrinal Upheaval 
The minority rule, on the other hand, is justified on the grounds that the 
tort of malicious prosecution is not “completed” until exoneration, and an 
aversion to the long tail of liability created by the majority rule trigger.54 In 
Illinois, the minority rule is also justified primarily on the basis of precedent, 
which has recently been called into doubt.55 Until recently, the only Illinois 
case addressing the trigger for malicious prosecution was a 1978 Illinois 
Appellate Court decision, Security Mutual Casualty Co. v. Harbor Insurance 
Co., which was reversed on other grounds by the Illinois Supreme Court.56 
In 2010, the Seventh Circuit held that Security Mutual established the rule in 
Illinois that coverage for malicious prosecution is triggered at exoneration, 
and reaffirmed this holding in two 2012 decisions.57 In American Safety v. 
City of Waukegan, Judge Easterbrook noted that Security Mutual “stood 
unquestioned for 34 years—no court in Illinois has so much as hinted at 
 
50 See id. (noting “there is no agreement on when the tort of malicious prosecution occurs for 
insurance coverage purposes”). Because Wallace held false arrest claims accrue once a person appears 
before a judge, in the wrongful conviction context most false arrest claims will be timebarred by the 
statute of limitations, as that claim was in Wallace itself. See 549 U.S. at 390. 
51 See Am. Safety, 678 F.3d at 479; City of Erie, 109 F.3d at 160. 
52 A notice the prosecution has been abandoned. Nolle Prosequi, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). 
53 City of Erie, 109 F.3d at 160–61. 
54 Am. Safety, 678 F.3d at 480 (noting that “for these torts, exoneration is the final element” and that 
the majority “position also implies a long tail on liability, which is opposite to the industry’s usual view 
that liability should be as close as possible to the policy dates”). 
55 See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. City of Zion, 18 N.E.3d 193, 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014), 
petition for leave to appeal denied, 23 N.E.3d 1207 (Ill. 2015). 
56 382 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), rev’d on other grounds, 397 N.E.2d 839 (Ill. 1979). 
57 Northfield Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 701 F.3d 1124, 1137 (7th Cir. 2012); Am. Safety, 
678 F.3d 475, 478–79; Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McFatridge, 604 F.3d 335, 337, 345 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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doubts about its conclusion” and that its reversal on grounds other than the 
merits did not deprive it of precedential value.58 Nonetheless, in 2013 an 
Illinois circuit court issued an opinion rejecting Security Mutual as binding 
precedent and applying the majority rule to a malicious prosecution claim.59 
Another circuit court followed suit in January 2014.60 The Illinois Appellate 
Court affirmed both decisions, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied 
petitions to appeal in both cases.61 
C. Sudden Uncertainty and the Opportunity for Doctrinal Innovation 
The suddenly uncertain state of insurance law in Illinois offers a useful 
opportunity to reconsider the triggers for coverage of wrongful conviction 
torts, especially for the triggers for Brady violations, and for drawing 
comparisons to the approach taken in asbestos exposure cases. In asbestos 
exposure cases, many courts have applied a continuous trigger and assigned 
liability across any relevant policies held during the entirety of the time the 
exposure occurred.62 Courts adopted continuous triggers to maximize 
recovery by the injured parties and to resolve causation problems created by 
the long latency period between exposure and the manifestation of injury.63 
This approach has been criticized for providing parties more coverage than 
they purchased and imposing an undue burden on insurance companies 
because “[c]ontinuous-trigger rulings in asbestos cases have been the ruin of 
more than one insurance company.”64 As a result, courts are likely to be 
extremely wary of any novel continuous trigger rules. Nonetheless, many of 
the same concerns are present in the context of Brady violations. In Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co., the New Jersey Supreme Court noted:  
Our concepts of legal causation were developed in an age of Newtonian physics, 
not of molecular biology. Were it possible to know when a toxic substance 
clicks on a switch that alters irrevocably the composition of the body . . . we 
 
58 Am. Safety, 678 F.3d at 478–79. 
59 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. City of Zion, No. 10 MR 2227, 2013 WL 3476145, at *18 (Ill. 
Cir. Ct. May 10, 2013). 
60 Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, No. 13 MR 0425, at 17–18 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Jan. 30, 2014). 
61 Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 33 N.E.3d 613, 615 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015), petition for 
leave to appeal denied, 32 N.E.3d 674 (Ill. 2015); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., v. City of Zion, 
18 N.E.3d 193, 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014), petition for leave to appeal denied, 23 N.E.3d 1207 (Ill. 2015). 
62 See Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent Diseases Resulting from Mass 
Products, 64 MD. L. REV. 613, 647 (2005) (noting that “many courts now follow the ‘triple-trigger’ or 
‘continuous-trigger’ approach and hold that any insurer who provided coverage at any time between the 
initial exposure of the victim to the product and the subsequent manifestation of disease is liable”); see 
also Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. 
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 993–95 (N.J. 1994). 
63 See, e.g., Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 981, 985, 993. 
64 Am. Safety Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 678 F.3d 475, 481 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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might be more confident that . . . damages had taken place during a particular 
policy.65  
The harm imposed by Brady violations is similarly opaque and resistant to 
traditional notions of causation, and a similar trigger approach warrants 
consideration. 
IV. THE BRADY DOCTRINE IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH ISOLATED INSURANCE 
TRIGGERS 
This Part will demonstrate that the insurance triggers used for malicious 
prosecution claims are incompatible with Brady violations for three reasons. 
First, determining the moment “when” a Brady violation occurs is a 
labyrinthine and likely futile task. Second, malicious prosecution’s single 
triggering event ignores the unique nuance of a Brady violation. Finally, 
Brady claims, unlike malicious prosecution claims, raise procedural, not 
substantive, issues. Each of these three contentions will be addressed in turn 
below. 
A. Multiple Proceedings—The Circuit Split Over the Accrual of 
Brady Claims 
1. Doctrinal  and  Practical  Difficulty.—It  is  doctrinally  difficult  to 
determine “when” a Brady violation occurs.66 The four primary reasons for 
this include: (1) the complexity arising from potentially large numbers of 
individual tortfeasors and multiple violations involving the same piece of 
evidence, (2) the temporal disconnect between the “harm” at trial and the 
actual Brady violation, (3) the long timespans involved and the potential for 
retrials, appeals, and post-conviction proceedings, and (4) the secretive 
nature of the violations themselves. These factors confound accrual 
determinations and threaten to leave municipalities underinsured for 
wrongful convictions, which will not only burden already debt-laden 
communities but will also threaten to deprive the wrongfully convicted of 
adequate recoveries. 
Moreover, Brady’s incompatibility with current insurance doctrine is 
clear from the courts’ tendency to conflate Brady claims with malicious 
prosecution suits. Both the majority and minority rules for malicious 
prosecution preclude the possibility of triggering coverage for Brady 
violations that occur during a person’s incarceration. A few courts have 
narrowly acknowledged separate triggers for every trial or retrial for certain 
 
65 650 A.2d at 985. 
66 See infra Section IV.A.2. 
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torts in an approach highly similar to the malicious prosecution trigger.67 
Applying a rule crafted for malicious prosecution to Brady violations is 
problematic because it is designed for a tort that captures an entire judicial 
proceeding and therefore is ill equipped to capture the types of discrete, 
individual actions at issue in Brady. While the state’s filing of charges is the 
unitary act that gives rise to a malicious prosecution claim, police officers 
and prosecutors might individually violate Brady when they suppress or 
otherwise fail to disclose exculpatory evidence, which might occur before, 
during, or after trial.68 By separating the trigger from the actions that give 
rise to suits for Brady violations, courts are drastically limiting the ability of 
municipalities to insure themselves against suits for years of wrongdoing 
perpetrated by law enforcement against people after they have been 
convicted.  
2. Attempts  to  Reconcile  the  Doctrinal  Difficulty.—The question of 
“when” Brady violations occur is far from an academic or theoretical 
problem. Courts are already wrestling with the notion of when Brady claims 
accrue in circumstances where a defendant is subjected to multiple trials or 
reaches a plea agreement after an initial trial is invalidated.69 Though many 
of these cases do not deal with the insurance implications, they are concerned 
with whether and when a Brady violation is barred by the Supreme Court 
decision Heck v. Humphrey,70 and when the statute of limitations begins to 
run. While Heck would appear to bar any Brady claims until a defendant has 
been exonerated, the later decision Wallace v. Kato introduced 
complications.71 After Wallace, courts must analyze whether a civil § 1983 
 
67 See, e.g., Westport Ins. Co. v. City of Waukegan, 75 F. Supp. 3d 821, 827 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (finding 
Fifth Amendment false confession claim could trigger coverage for each trial and retrial without explicitly 
discussing Brady claims); Coregis Ins. Co. v. City of Harrisburg, No. 1:03-CV-920, 2006 WL 860710, at 
*11 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2006) (rejecting a continuous trigger for Brady violations but leaving open the 
possibility of retrials triggering other coverage); see also Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 
2014) (finding a defendant’s § 1983 Brady claims from his first trial were not barred by Heck). For a brief 
discussion of Heck and its significance, see infra note 70. But see Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys 
Office, 767 F.3d 379, 390 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding a defendant’s “Brady-like” claims did not accrue until 
nolle prosequi was entered). 
68 See infra Section IV.B. 
69 See, e.g., Owens, 767 F.3d at 390; Jackson, 749 F.3d at 760; Poventud v. City of New York, 
750 F.3d 121, 134 (2d Cir. 2014); Smith v. Gonzales, 222 F.3d 1220, 1222–23 (10th Cir. 2000). 
70 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck established the eponymous “Heck bar” that prevents defendants from 
mounting collateral attacks on their convictions through civil suits. It established the rule that civil 
lawsuits that would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of a conviction or sentence must be dismissed until 
the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. Id. at 486–87. The corollary to this is that a claim cannot 
accrue and the statute of limitations cannot begin to run until the conviction activating the bar has been 
invalidated. Id. at 489. 
71 549 U.S. 384 (2007). Wallace held that courts must look to the closest common law analogue for 
when claims accrue, and that because a false arrest claim accrues once a defendant is held pursuant to 
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claim arises out of the trial itself, or something just incidentally associated 
with it.72 When a defendant is subjected to multiple trials and brings suit for 
a Brady violation that occurred at the initial trial while he or she is 
undergoing a retrial, a court is forced to assess whether that violation is self-
contained in the initial trial or unavoidably connected to the subsequent one. 
In other words, it has to make a determination about when Brady claims 
accrue. Three circuits have found that a Brady claim for violations during an 
invalidated trial cannot impugn subsequent trials or plea agreements, and that 
the Brady claim thus accrues immediately upon invalidation of the trial.73 
The Fourth Circuit held that the Brady claims of a defendant subjected to 
multiple trials do not accrue until the convictions are invalidated and the state 
enters a nolle prosequi ending the possibility of further proceedings.74 
The Fourth Circuit’s nolle prosequi requirement prevented claims from 
being barred by the statute of limitations.75 The Ninth and Second Circuit 
cases found that more immediate accruals allowed people facing retrial and 
people who plead guilty to a lesser charge to bring suit.76 The Tenth Circuit 
in Smith found the claims timebarred because they accrued immediately after 
a conviction was vacated, even while the defendant remained in prison.77 
However, the court was careful to note that the claims would not have 
accrued had the defendant “remained subject to . . . serious charges and . . . 
on trial for his life . . . when the malicious prosecution conspiracy again 
result[s] in presentation of the false case against him.”78 
These cases highlight how Brady violations can be conceptualized as 
both discrete and monolithic. In Smith, the Tenth Circuit has captured this 
dual nature by allowing claims to go forward where they can be sensibly 
compartmentalized, but reserving the ability to preserve the viability of 
claims that cannot in the interest of justice. An analogous commonsense 
approach for insurance triggers is desirable. 
3. Implications.—What is clear from these cases is that a municipality 
in the Ninth Circuit stands a better chance of obtaining coverage from the 
policy in place when a Brady violation actually occurred than a municipality 
 
legal process, it does not necessarily impugn the judicial process, and therefore the statute of limitations 
begins to run at that moment. Id. at 388, 391–94.  
72 Id. at 390–91. For example, in Wallace the claim was about how the defendant got to the 
courthouse, not what happened in the courthouse itself.  
73 Jackson, 749 F.3d at 761; Poventud, 750 F.3d at 134, 138; Smith, 222 F.3d at 1222–23. 
74 Owens, 767 F.3d at 390. 
75 Id.  
76 Jackson, 749 F.3d at 761; Poventud, 750 F.3d at 134, 138. 
77 Smith, 222 F.3d at 1222. 
78 Id. at 1223 (quoting Robinson v. Maruffi, 895 F.2d 649, 655 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
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in Illinois, where a court ushers everything under the umbrella of malicious 
prosecution. Merely adopting the Ninth Circuit’s approach, however, is 
problematic not only because it may be inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wallace,79 but because it will threaten to bar later claims 
by wrongfully convicted exonerees under the statute of limitations, if applied 
without tolling. Moreover, it will generate an incredibly fact-intensive 
approach that is made even more difficult in the face of the secretive and 
ongoing nature of many Brady violations.80 In other words, what the circuit 
split over Brady claim accrual reveals is that Brady claims are different, 
exhibiting characteristics of both discrete, self-contained torts and ongoing 
torts like malicious prosecution. It is this lack of clarity that has been 
unaddressed by current insurance doctrines and creates the risk of 
suboptimal outcomes and underinsurance for municipalities. 
B. The Interplay of Action and Omission in the Brady Doctrine 
Application of the single-trigger approach to Brady violations ignores 
the positive actions that can lead to Brady violations while simultaneously 
disregarding the fact that Brady claims are directed at individual, not state, 
conduct. As background, Brady violations can often be characterized as 
either omissions or positive action interchangeably. This observation is little 
more than semantic, but it is nonetheless significant for purposes of 
insurance coverage. The framing of the doctrine as an affirmative duty to 
disclose suggests a characterization of Brady violations as omissions. But 
the failure to disclose may also be accomplished by positive actions, for 
instance when a police officer destroys or conceals evidence. In this case, the 
violation could still easily be characterized as the non-happening of the 
disclosure to the defense, but this negative definition swallows up any 
nuance or definition that would more accurately capture the wrongful 
behavior. The tension generated by these equivalent yet competing 
frameworks is at least one contributing factor to the improper application of 
the malicious prosecution trigger to Brady violations. 
An example from an actual Brady case can demonstrate both the 
unintuitive implications of conceptualizing violations solely as omissions 
and the tenuousness of locating violations at trial rather than any other point 
 
79 See Owens, 767 F.3d at 390 (“Here, the parties acknowledge that, unlike in Wallace, false 
imprisonment is not the tort ‘most analogous’ to Owens’s § 1983 claims. Instead, they properly agree that 
the tort of malicious prosecution, which the Wallace Court recognized as an ‘entirely distinct’ tort, 
provides the closest analogy to Owens’s Brady-like claim. . . . Thus, following Wallace, we must 
determine the start date of Owens’s § 1983 claims by looking to the start date of the common-law tort 
most analogous to his claims—here, malicious prosecution.”). 
80 See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint at 25, Rivera v. Lake Cty., No. 12 C 8665 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 
2014). 
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in time. In the Seventh Circuit case Manning v. Miller, the plaintiff, 
Manning, was a former FBI informant who alleged that FBI agents framed 
him for kidnapping and murder.81 After his convictions were overturned, he 
brought a Bivens claim82 and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the agents for 
conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights.83 The defendants 
argued the Brady claims amounted to a conspiracy to commit perjury, for 
which there is absolute immunity from civil liability.84 The court disagreed 
and upheld Manning’s Brady claim because the alleged conduct went 
“beyond perjury.”85 The alleged conduct spanned years and included 
inducing a false witness identification, inducing fabricated testimony, 
fabricating evidence of a confession, destroying the tapes they alleged had 
contained a recording of the confession, and their failure to disclose any of 
these actions.86 
At the outset, it is clear that the behavior proscribed by Brady is far 
more diverse and nuanced than just the mere failure to act. But it is the 
court’s immunity analysis that reveals the questionable integrity of the 
omission characterization. The Manning court noted that the inquiry into 
absolute immunity for perjury was fact dependent, with cases falling on a 
spectrum.87 While there is absolute immunity from civil liability for 
committing perjury, whether there is immunity for participating in someone 
else’s perjury is more complicated.88 
The Manning court noted one case, House v. Belford, that held that a 
witness and a prosecutor were both immune from civil liability for 
conspiracy to commit perjury, while another case, Newsome v. McCabe, did 
not extend immunity to nonwitnesses who helped prepare perjured 
testimony.89 An examination of the cases invoked by Manning reveals that 
whether a rule governing the divergent outcomes can have any integrity is 
debatable at best. House did not involve Brady suppressions and held that 
 
81 355 F.3d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 2004). 
82 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390–97 (1971) 
(holding Fourth Amendment implies a civil cause of action). 
83 Manning, 355 F.3d at 1030–31. 
84 Id. at 1031. 
85 Id. at 1032–33. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 1031 (“The law regarding immunity is very fact dependent, and the various facts courts have 
considered reveal a spectrum of behavior that has ultimately been categorized as immune or not 
immune.”). 
88 See id. (“On the end of the spectrum where behavior is solidly considered to be immune from civil 
liability is perjury.”).  
89 Id. at 1032 (citing House v. Belford, 956 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1992); Newsom v. McCabe, 
256 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
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attempts to “differentiate between a conspiracy to present perjured testimony 
and the act of presenting perjured testimony is a distinction without a 
difference. A person may not be prosecuted for conspiring to commit an act 
that he may perform with impunity.”90 Newsome, on the other hand, held that 
the defendants “were not held liable for conspiring with the eyewitnesses to 
commit perjury; their liability is under the due process clause because they 
concealed exculpatory evidence—the details of how they induced the 
witnesses to finger Newsome.”91 
In other words, there might be immunity for preparing perjured 
testimony, and giving perjured testimony, if one simply discloses to the 
defendant evidence of the perjurious behavior. This distinction is tenuous on 
its face and bears a significant resemblance to the “distinction without a 
difference”92 at issue in House. But the use of Brady violations to dictate the 
outcomes in the immunity analysis for perjury creates even greater tension 
with the notion of Brady as a trial right. In other words, if it is accepted that 
Brady exclusively concerns itself with the corruption of the trial process 
itself, then the harm is not when the preparation of the testimony was 
undisclosed, but when the perjury occurred.93  
The only possible counter is that Brady does not ensure a perfectly fair 
trial, but is merely intended to give defendants a fighting chance to 
persuasively call the other side a liar at trial. This is a conception of Brady 
almost exclusively as a sword and not a shield from misconduct.94 The result 
is a situation where there is immunity for preparing perjured testimony, but 
some kinds of preparations that rise to the level of Brady violations could 
incur liability. But of course in a practical sense reconciling Brady 
disclosures with perjury is almost impossible—in most situations, perjured 
incriminating testimony implies a failure to disclose exculpatory evidence 
(one’s knowledge of one’s perjured testimony). Not only is the immunity 
 
90 House, 956 F.2d at 720. 
91 Newsome v. McCabe, 319 F.3d 301, 304 (7th Cir. 2003). 
92 House, 956 F.2d at 720. 
93 Consider whether there is a claim for the destruction of exculpatory evidence without a conviction. 
See Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 588 (7th Cir. 2012) (“We have suggested, without squarely 
holding, that ‘a trial that results in an acquittal can never lead to a [valid] [sic] claim for a Brady violation 
because the trial produced a fair result, even without the exculpatory evidence.’”) (quoting Mosley v. City 
of Chicago, 614 F.3d 391, 397 (7th Cir. 2010)), cert. denied sub nom. McFatridge v. Whitlock, 133 S. Ct. 
981 (2013). 
94 Also consider the situation where a police officer destroys a videotape of a coerced confession. 
The failure to disclose the existence and destruction of the tape surely denies the plaintiff a shield against 
perjured testimony. If he knew about the destruction, he could provide evidence or testimony to that 
effect. But the destruction of the video itself denied the plaintiff a powerful weapon. There is surely a 
distinction here that matters. The destruction of the tape is more harmful (and also involves failed 
disclosure) than a failure to disclose that a confession was coerced on its own. 
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meaningless at that point, but it ignores the seemingly obvious fact that the 
Fifth Amendment should proscribe framing people for crimes, not merely 
choosing to remain silent about it. 
There are three key points to observe: (1) the slippery and branching 
nature of Brady is obscured by categorical phrases like “Brady is a trial right” 
or “failure to disclose”; (2) testimonial immunity analysis demonstrates 
some of the incoherencies that arise from trying to compartmentalize 
Brady—how can perjured testimony not implicitly violate Brady?;95 and (3) 
courts do not have a principled way of identifying when Brady violations 
occur. The Newsome immunity analysis displays a willingness to locate 
Brady occurrences apart from trial in order to reconcile finding liability for 
violations with other doctrines like immunity. 
Tellingly, Manning is not an isolated case. For example, in Whitlock v. 
Brueggeman, the court undertook an immunity analysis for three different 
time periods in which constitutional violations were alleged against a 
prosecutor.96 This inquiry makes little sense if process torts occur only at 
trial. In Whitlock, the court considered when a prosecutor’s unethical 
investigative tactics, such as coercion, culminate in a due process violation 
when the evidence obtained is introduced at trial.97 In this situation, the 
prosecutor still enjoys absolute immunity (rather than the qualified immunity 
afforded police officers) because the violation associated with the evidence 
“cannot be traced back as far as its creation.”98 This is at least in part because 
“[e]vidence collected with these kind of suspect techniques, unlike falsified 
evidence and perjured testimony, may turn out to be true.”99 However there 
is no absolute immunity for the prosecutor who fabricated evidence because 
the act itself violates due process so long as the evidence caused the claimant 
an injury by being introduced in a prosecution.100 So in this case, the due 
process violation accomplished by the evidence can “be traced back as far as 
its creation.”101 Here, again, the interplay between Brady as a positive action 
and omission is evident. There are also temporal distinctions that are in 
tension with the notion of Brady as a trial event. 
 
95 But on the other hand, the destruction of evidence in furtherance of that same perjury is the 
definition of Brady itself—this suggests that multiple violations could center around a single piece of 
evidence. 
96 682 F.3d at 576. 
97 Id. at 584–85. 
98 Id. at 585. 
99 Id. at 584. 
100 Id. at 584–85 (“[The] creation of false evidence also violates due process, so long as a plaintiff 
can show the fabrication actually injured her in some way.”).  
101 Id. at 585. 
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The potential for application of a single isolated insurance trigger, as 
for malicious prosecution, not only overlooks the positive actions that run 
afoul of the Brady doctrine, it ignores the reality that Brady claims target 
individual conduct (or the failure to train those individuals) rather than state 
conduct itself (as is the case with a malicious prosecution claim). 
C. Individual Culpability and the Procedural Interests of Brady 
Section 1983 Brady claims target individual conduct that deprives 
people of due process, while malicious prosecution claims provide a remedy 
for being subjected to process without probable cause. Applying the 
malicious prosecution trigger to Brady violations completely ignores this 
individual culpability by only considering the process itself (or lack thereof) 
rather than the actions depriving someone of due process. 
The essence of the Brady obligation is procedural—it is designed to 
reinforce the fairness of trials.102 In United States v. Bagley, the Supreme 
Court held that: “The Brady rule is based on the requirement of due process. 
Its purpose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by 
which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage of justice does not 
occur.”103 
This procedural quality of the Brady obligation is an important 
distinction from the substantive torts that often accompany Brady claims.104 
These procedural concerns at the heart of Brady should inform any analysis 
of when Brady violations occur and what harm ensues. 
The Brady doctrine’s status as a trial right does not inherently provide 
a uniform or singular approach to identifying when violations occur. The 
complications that arise in the event of multiple proceedings, or when 
multiple tortious actions center on a single piece of evidence, are, in fact, 
always present in any Brady violation. Any simplicity promised by the 
contention that Brady violations are simply monolithic omissions that occur 
at trial can only be illusory. Trials themselves have too many discrete parts, 
and immunity analyses will continue to raise difficult doctrinal problems. 
Rather, the procedural and trial concerns at the center of Brady should drive 
a more practical inquiry into when actions and omissions eliminated 
opportunities to counter incriminating evidence presented at trial. These 
opportunities can occur at any time because frustrating a defendant’s ability 
 
102 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).  
103 Id. 
104 Newsome v. McCabe, 256 F.3d 747, 751–52 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding the plaintiff did not have a 
malicious prosecution claim but did have a Brady claim). 
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to present exculpatory evidence challenging a conviction is clearly a 
deprivation of due process. 
V. A CONTINUOUS TRIGGER SHOULD BE APPLIED TO COVERAGE FOR 
BRADY VIOLATIONS 
This Part will first explain why a continuous trigger rule resolves the 
doctrinal and practical difficulties discussed in Part IV, and how applying a 
continuous trigger to coverage for Brady violations is also warranted by the 
existing doctrine. Second, it will contend that a continuous trigger is justified 
by practical concerns related to identifying Brady violations and the 
activation of policy triggers by them. Finally, it will argue that a continuous 
trigger facilitates the realization of certain policy concerns related to both 
maximizing recovery for the victims of wrongful conviction and minimizing 
the impact of those recoveries on financially distressed communities. 
A. A Continuous Trigger is Consistent with the Brady Doctrine. 
Brady violations are conceptually, doctrinally, and temporally distinct 
from malicious prosecution and warrant a distinct and continuous trigger. As 
discussed above, Brady violations and malicious prosecution are different 
torts, composed of different elements.105 While malicious prosecution is a 
substantive tort focused more broadly on the lack of probable cause, Brady 
is a procedural right that focuses on individuals’ disclosure of distinct pieces 
of exculpatory or impeachment evidence.106 Malicious prosecution includes 
favorable termination as an element and aims to capture the judicial 
proceeding itself, while Brady targets actions taken and not taken within the 
judicial proceeding. 
It is these differences that create the potential for Brady violations 
before, during, and after trial107—a temporality that would be nonsensical 
when applied to malicious prosecution. The right to evidence continues 
through post-conviction and clemency proceedings because “the taint on the 
trial that took place continues throughout the proceedings, and thus the duty 
to disclose and allow correction of that taint continues.”108 
 
105 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281–82 (1999); Ritchey v. Maksin, 376 N.E.2d 991, 993 
(Ill. 1978). 
106 See Newsome, 256 F.3d at 751–52. 
107 Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 515 (7th Cir. 2012) (noting the Brady obligation “remain[s] in 
full effect on direct appeal and in the event of retrial”); Patterson v. Burge, 328 F. Supp. 2d 878, 889 
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (noting Brady violations can occur before, during, or after trial). 
108 Whitlock v. Brueggemann, 682 F.3d 567, 588 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Steidl v. Fermon, 494 F.3d 
623, 630 (7th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied sub nom. McFatridge v. Whitlock, 133 S. Ct. 981 (2013); see also 
Tillman v. Burge, 813 F. Supp. 2d 946, 963 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (looking at effect of Brady violations on 
post-conviction proceedings and state decision to oppose appeals). 
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Courts’ routine conflation of Brady violations and malicious 
prosecution ignores these important differences, and a single isolated trigger 
is incapable of addressing the numerous and varied opportunities to violate 
a person’s Brady rights. Even when a court is willing to apply a trigger for 
every trial and retrial, it mistakes the object of the Brady doctrine—
exculpatory evidence known at trial—with the violation of the Brady 
doctrine, which is not confined to the trial itself. Courts already acknowledge 
the lack of temporal limitations on Brady outside of the insurance context. 
The Seventh Circuit has explained that the duty must be ongoing or else no 
one would be able to raise Brady issues on appeal or in collateral attacks.109 
The different immunity analyses in Manning and Whitlock are only possible 
if Brady violations are discrete actions that occur at different moments in 
time.110 
The potential for multiple violations to center on a single piece of 
evidence, in addition to the strange timing issues created by ongoing 
suppressions of evidence withheld at an earlier trial, threaten to over-
complicate the issues surrounding Brady. Section 1983 suits are “read 
against the background of tort liability.”111 This means that in “constitutional-
tort cases as in other cases, ‘a man [is] responsible for the natural 
consequences of his actions.’”112 If police officers can be accountable for 
their actions and omissions that unlawfully keep people in prison, a 
municipality should be able to hold accountable its insurance policy for those 
same wrongful actions in that time period, something the current triggering 
rules do not allow for. Police officers will not be able to shield themselves 
from liability by pointing to their own prior bad acts or the prior bad acts of 
others, and insurance companies should be denied such a defense as well. 
For many Brady violations, it will be simple to tie a daily duty to disclose to 
a daily harm of incarceration that better fits reality. 
Insurance law itself is also more consistent with a continuous trigger 
approach to Brady violations than with a single trigger. In Illinois, courts 
construe any ambiguities and limitations in an insurance policy liberally in 
favor of the insured.113 Illinois employs the “cause theory” to determine 
whether an occurrence triggered coverage, which broadly means that an act 
that increased the insured’s liability will constitute a separate occurrence.114 
 
109 Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 588.  
110 See id.; Manning v. Miller, 355 F.3d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 2004). 
111 Whitlock, 682 F.3d at 582 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961)).  
112 Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 993 (7th Cir. 1988) (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187). 
113 See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 75 (Ill. 1997) (“In addition, provisions that 
limit or exclude coverage will be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer.”). 
114 Nicor, Inc. v. Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs. Ltd., 860 N.E.2d 280, 287, 294 (Ill. 2006). 
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Brady violations likely present a case for joint and several liability.115 The 
potential for law enforcement officers to find themselves jointly and 
severally liable because of actions taken post-conviction mandates triggering 
the policies for the same conduct. 
Moreover, when analyzing omissions, Illinois courts will look to either 
the potential to revisit the omission or apply a “time and space” test to 
determine whether there are multiple triggers.116 Under either of these 
approaches, it is clear that suppressions stretching across years of 
incarceration and post-conviction proceedings go beyond the mere effects of 
a single omission. Applying a malicious prosecution-style trigger to Brady 
violations ignores the human agency of the continued decision to withhold 
evidence and the potential for increasing liability by actions taken after trial, 
such as rehiding or refabricating evidence. A continuous trigger for Brady 
violations is therefore not only more consistent with Brady case law, but with 
the rest of insurance law itself. 
B. A Continuous Trigger Resolves Practical Problems of Coverage 
The continuous trigger that is applied to policies for asbestos exposure 
addressed a latency problem and difficulties in calculating and apportioning 
causation and liability across multiple policies.117 Brady violations present 
extremely similar problems. They also present a latency problem, but it is 
caused by ignorance about the cause of the injury, rather than the injury 
itself. As a result, even though a person is aware that they are being harmed 
or injured, it may not fully come to light who is responsible for years, if ever. 
The secrecy that accompanies Brady violations may preclude ever obtaining 
an accurate and complete picture of who played what part in suppressing 
exculpatory evidence. In addition to problems of discoverability and time, a 
single piece of evidence might be implicated by multiple Brady violations. 
In this case, just as linking an injury to specific asbestos exposure dates is 
difficult, it may be hard to fairly divide liability among the multiple agents 
and actions that led to a single day of incarceration. A continuous trigger 
 
115 See, e.g., Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 179 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Federal common law principles 
of tort and damages govern recovery under section 1983. It is axiomatic that where several independent 
actors concurrently or consecutively produce a single, indivisible injury, each actor will be held jointly 
and severally liable for the entire injury.” (citations omitted)).  
116 Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay, 905 N.E.2d 747, 756 (Ill. 2009); Roman Catholic Diocese of Joliet v. 
Lee, 685 N.E.2d 932, 938 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). 
117 See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. United Ins. Co, 650 A.2d 974, 985 (N.J. 1994) (“Our concepts of legal 
causation were developed in an age of Newtonian physics, not of molecular biology. Were it possible to 
know when a toxic substance clicks on a switch that alters irrevocably the composition of the body and 
before which no change has ‘occurred,’ we might be more confident that occurrence-causing damages 
had taken place during a particular policy period. The limitations of science in that respect only compound 
the limitations of law.”). 
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avoids the temptation to engage in mathematics that can offer only the 
illusion of precision while still ensuring that liability is relatively fair across 
policies. An insurance company will only be responsible for days of 
imprisonment that occurred during its policies. If not every year, then at least 
every official proceeding could trigger a policy by representing another 
opportunity to come forward with the evidence. 
Admittedly, if the adoption of Brady-triggers independent from 
malicious prosecution occurs, broad federal pleading requirements and the 
concealment that violates due process will necessitate extremely broad duties 
to defend against complaints alleging Brady violations. This is not 
necessarily a defect, however, because it will make insurers’ assumption of 
their duty to defend the default, as opposed to the current regime where every 
insurer may try to deny the existence of its duty to defend. 
C. Municipal Default and the Policy Implications of a Continuous Trigger 
An important advantage of a continuous trigger is that it will ensure 
adequate recoveries for victims in addition to protecting financially 
distressed municipalities from enormous liabilities. This was a valid concern 
in asbestos litigation and it should be even more so in the Brady context, 
given the overriding interest in making sure people are not victims of the 
state twice over.118 If insurance law proceeds unchanged in Illinois, the risk 
of municipal defaults and empty recoveries for the wrongfully convicted is 
real. For example, in 2003 the Illinois town of Brooklyn entered Chapter 9 
bankruptcy after dropping its insurance in the face of mounting liabilities 
from embezzlement, police misconduct, and shrinking revenue.119  
Additionally, a continuous trigger helps protect the expectations of 
municipalities, who typically face an enormous time lapse between the 
policies in place at initiation of a prosecution and the policy in place at 
exoneration. Currently, they must not only hope that their original insurer is 
still available to pay out claims, but also have difficulties in assessing both 
the risks of wrongful actions that are regularly increasing liabilities and the 
extent of their coverage for those actions. It is essentially impossible to 
 
118 See Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Owens-Illinois, 
650 A.2d at 992; James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure Tort Claims: The Debate 
Over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 625, 649 (1997) (“Jurisdictions adopting the 
continuous trigger theory have also sought to substantiate their holding on the ground that it is consistent 
with the often stated public policy of maximizing coverage.”). 
119 Better Gov’t Ass’n, How a Municipal Bankruptcy Grew in Brooklyn (Illinois), CHI. SUN TIMES 
(Dec. 6, 2014, 11:11 AM), http://chicago.suntimes.com/politics/7/71/213882/how-a-municipal-
bankruptcy-grew-in-brooklyn-illinois [http://perma.cc/FRG2-7B3S?type=live] (“To save money the 
village let its liability insurance coverage lapse, a move that left it unable to afford mounting legal bills, 
settlements and judgments in lawsuits relating to the town’s financial mismanagement, employee injuries 
and allegations of police misconduct.”). 
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purchase additional insurance for liabilities arising and increasing from a 
conviction that has already occurred. Triggering only one policy completely 
ignores wrongful acts and omissions, furthering suppression for decades and 
essentially rendering this wrongdoing completely uninsurable. 
A continuous trigger will incentivize insurers to encourage law 
enforcement, through premiums, to stop suppressing evidence. For now, the 
limitations on the misconduct triggering policies tilt the odds and incentivize 
an insurer to simply roll the dice and hope that no one gets out of prison. 
Additionally, any arguments for administrative efficiency apply even more 
strongly to a continuous trigger. Insurers are still likely to point the finger at 
each other in an effort to avoid liability when only one policy is triggered. If 
every policy is triggered, courts need only verify whether a municipality 
purchased coverage and from whom. 
These are not the enormous and problematic implications that attended 
asbestos cases. While wrongful convictions are a significant problem, in 
absolute terms, they affect only a small number of individuals and insurance 
carriers. Liability is also contained—an insurer would only be liable for the 
days someone was in prison during its policy, which still offers insurers 
predictability. 
CONCLUSION 
The single, isolated trigger applied to malicious prosecution torts is 
incompatible with the Brady doctrine. Violations can occur multiple times, 
over multiple decades, in multiple proceedings. The inherent secrecy of the 
tort and the inability to calculate and apportion liability across policy periods 
in a principled way call for an approach that is flexible and comprehensive. 
A continuous trigger better tracks the substantive conduct underlying Brady 
violations and will ensure that the wrongfully convicted are not victimized a 
second time by municipal fiscal irresponsibility. A continuous trigger also 
offers administrative efficiency and will foreclose the contentious 
declaratory judgment proceedings that arise as insurers invariably attempt to 
avoid paying out on policies. At the very least, applying a trigger for every 
judicial proceeding, such as trials, retrials, direct appeals, habeas petitions, 
and parole hearings will provide coverage for every judicial event where a 
person is deprived of due process. 
 
